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In Protagoras, Socrates makes an argument against the idea that akrasia is 
possible––that is, he argues that it is impossible for an agent to deliberately choose 
an action that the agent does not believe will be to its benefit. For the purposes of 
this paper, Socrates’ argument against akrasia in Protagoras will be: (1) An agent 
has a choice to do or not do action X, (2) the agent believes that doing action X is 
more beneficial than not doing it, (3) so the agent will always do action X. In this 
paper, I will argue that akrasia is possible, contradicting Socrates’ view and several 
other arguments that favor his position. To do so, I will present a counterexample 
which shows that akrasia is possible, even on a metalevel, and then several possible 
objections. 
The Counterexample Required 
Saying that akrasia is impossible is a bold claim as it only takes one conceivable, 
possible instance of akrasia to be a sufficient counterexample; I will illustrate one 
such instance by positing the following premises. First, only reason is reliable to 
decide what actions are most beneficial. While the souls of the rest of the animal 
kingdom, and arguably some humans, seem to be devoid of reason and thus only 
have the unreasoned elements of the soul to obey, rational human beings have 
access as agents to reason, and it seems evident from examining the human 
condition that actions that most conform to reason are the clearest and most 
beneficial actions to take. Even if the capacity of the agent to reason is lesser than 
others, it is far more reliable to assess the benefits of an action, or even to acquire 
knowledge of the benefits of an action as Socrates proposes, than to rely on the 
unreasonable part or parts of the soul.1 Second, it follows that if reason rules, then 
what is most beneficial will be chosen. Third, it also follows that if reason does not 
rule, then what is most beneficial may or may not be chosen. This is evident when 
examining animal natures of all kinds, including humans. It is most beneficial to 
hydrate the body when one is dehydrated, and an appetite of thirst arises in the soul 
to compel an action of drinking water. However, if an agent, seduced by appetites 
to drink from a river that causes dysentery, drinks from the river to quell its thirst, 
the most beneficial option to abstain from drinking is abandoned in favor of the less 
beneficial option, leading to far worse dehydration than before. Clearly, when 
reason is not ruling, either because it is absent or silenced, the agent’s choices will 
be terribly unclear in choosing what is most beneficial. Fourth, the crux of the 
argument is that an agent can choose whether or not reason will rule it. As a 
conscious agent with access to reason, it seems evident that conscious choices are 
possible––that is, it seems evident that a rational agent has the ability to freely make 
its choices by virtue of its agency. If an agent has the ability to make choices, then 
it follows that the agent has the ability to decide whether or not its reason will rule 
 
1 Plato, Protagoras 356c-357c 
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its ultimate actions. If the agent does not have this ability, then it seems that no 
agency exists in the agent at all and that all people, who are mistakenly ascribed 
agency, are really just automatons obeying whatever part of the soul happens to be 
controlling their actions, which seems absurd. Even if this were not absurd, then it 
seems that Socrates’ argument cannot apply to people as agents, since these people 
would not have agency after all, and thus his argument would be irrelevant to us. 
Fifth, it follows from the second and fourth premises that if the agent chooses to 
have reason rule, then it is indeed impossible for it to commit akrasia. An error in 
reason is hardly a conscious act against reason and thus the clearest depiction of 
right action. The counterexample emerges, however, in the sixth premise: if the 
agent chooses not to have reason rule, then it is conceivable and possible that it can 
commit akrasia. 
 The agent, in choosing to let something other than reason rule it, can fulfill 
the requirements of akrasia in that it will believe an action to be most to their benefit 
but will do an action that is less beneficial. The reasoning part of the soul, regardless 
of what position of authority the agent places it in its soul at any given moment, is 
the only part of the soul capable of determining the most beneficial action; it will 
form beliefs about the benefits of any action and it will inevitably form the most 
reliable beliefs. The reasoning agent, if it chooses at any moment to displace reason 
from its ruling position, still has reason in the soul with the correct beliefs about the 
benefits of any particular action. The agent committing akrasia, however, through 
whatever cause, places the unreasoning or nonrational parts of the soul in the ruling 
place, in which, as with the dysentery example, it can do the action which is least 
beneficial, while reason, from its now demoted position in the soul, continues to 
hold the belief that not drinking from the river is the most beneficial action. 
The Evident Psychology 
Before going into objections, I will briefly overview the psychology that I think is 
most apparent in the human soul as a rational agent. It seems evident that the human 
soul is made of distinct parts since it seems there are components of the soul that 
do not always agree. When one is, for example, tempted by an appetite which is 
known, or believed, to be not beneficial, there is a conscious awareness of this 
appetite and a conflict between the goals of that appetite and the goals of the part 
of the soul warning against it. The presence of conflict is enough to display that 
there is a division of interests within the agent, distinct parts of the soul. If the soul 
is simple, having no parts, there would be no conflict as something simple cannot 
move against itself. It also seems evident that the part warning against appetite is 
actively using reason and rational thought to dissuade the agent from indulging that 
appetite, and this is clearly the rational or reasonable part of the soul. How many 
components of the soul there are is not relevant to my argument, only that there is 
a distinct reasoning part of the soul opposed to a nonrational part or parts, though 
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the argument that Plato posits for three parts of the reasonable, the spirited, and the 
appetitive is compelling and enough to satisfy that there is a distinct reasoning part 
of the soul that has different motivations and reliability than the other part or parts.2 
What is key to my psychological claim, however, is that the reasoning part of the 
soul is the only part that can generate beliefs and that the agent, if one is an agent 
at all, has the ability and authority to decide what will rule or at least guide its 
actions. 
 There is an objection to this point about the reason alone holding the beliefs 
of a soul while the unreasoning parts of the soul do not that seems to be raised in 
the paper “Socrates on the Emotions.” The claim is made that Socrates’ objection 
to akrasia rests on the psychological claim that beliefs formed by the nonrational 
parts of the soul at some point override the beliefs formed by the rational part so 
that “the belief held by the agent at the time of acting is the product of a non-rational 
belief-forming process at the moment of action”; the soul is acting according to 
what it believes to be best.3 Brickhouse and Smith offer a scenario where a crowd 
of people, enraptured by a tragedy and feeling the emotions tailored to its delivery 
do not rationally accept that they are experiencing loss, yet their nonrational 
emotional beliefs override that rational disbelief allowing for emotions to swell up 
as if they were experiencing the tragedy themselves. The problem with this 
psychology is that it is not clear whether one is believing a story when one is 
engaging the presented material of a play or monologue or any other performance. 
Usually, the accepted parlance is that the audience ‘suspends their disbelief’ when 
consuming a story for entertainment or emotional satisfaction. There is something 
to this expression that should not be overlooked. The audience, in suspending their 
rational disbelief of the scenario presented before them, allows their emotions, or 
any nonrational element of their soul, to be satisfied when engaging in 
entertainment. They may be using the rational parts of their soul in a diminished 
state to create beliefs at the behest of their souls’ nonrational parts, rationalizing 
what is irrational, during the performance so that they may make sense of the 
situation being presented to them. So long as the story or performance is not so 
ludicrous as to awaken the rational part of the soul, causing the audience to put their 
rational disbelief guard up so to speak, the audience will accept what is happening. 
What cannot be said to be happening is that the nonrational parts of the soul are 
creating beliefs of their own to counter beliefs the rational part of the soul is making. 
Since it is not clear that nonrational parts of the soul can generate beliefs to 
overcome rational beliefs, this argument that one overcome with emotion does what 
he believes is most beneficial, thus making a point against akrasia, is objectionable. 
 
2 Plato, Republic 4.435c-442c 
3 Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, “Socrates on the Emotions,” Plato Journal 15 
(2015): 13-15 
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Perhaps one could grant that human psychology allows for beliefs to form 
in nonrational parts of the soul and that I am just obfuscating the objection by 
stating that rational parts of the soul create beliefs for nonrational parts, but a firm 
counterexample should dispel any such notion. It was made evident earlier that 
humans, as rational agents, have rational and nonrational parts of their soul. 
Animals are creatures with souls as well, but it cannot be said that they are rational 
souls. It can be said then that the animal’s soul is made of only nonrational parts, 
or perhaps is simple and nonrational. If animal souls can only be made of 
nonrational parts, and nonrational parts of the soul can generate beliefs, then it must 
be that animals can form beliefs. However, the capacity of animals to form beliefs 
does not seem evident in their behavior. In fact, given that animals act based on 
genetic programming and response to environmental stimuli, they may very well 
be described as organic automatons composed of appetites and behaviors to fulfill 
those appetites. Automatons do not form beliefs in any meaningful sense, as they 
are purely responding to programming when certain external conditions are met. 
Since it seems clear that animals cannot form beliefs, even though they have souls 
composed of nonrational parts, it can be concluded that nonrational parts of souls 
do not create beliefs of their own. This leaves the belief making solely up to the 
rational part of the soul, which means that if an agent follows an appetite against 
the beliefs generated by the rational part of the soul, it has committed akrasia. 
Agency Has a Say 
The question now arises whether I am obfuscating again by comparing animals to 
humans, as it seems consistent with Socrates’ argument to say that the rational parts 
of the soul, in making beliefs for the nonrational parts, is simply fulfilling a function 
in which the agent forms beliefs about what is best for one to do so that “everything 
we do is always motivated by a rational desire.”4 It is important to note, however, 
that according to the psychology I laid out, the agent’s power of choice plays the 
key role in determining whether the rational part of the soul is rightfully acting 
according to reason or simply doing the bidding of the nonrational forces of the 
soul. In this case where akrasia is possible, the nonrational forces bid the rational 
part of the soul to create beliefs to support their aims, and the agent has the final 
say in whether to have the rational part of the soul speak freely for itself or slavishly 
for the nonrational forces. For the agent to make its choice in a case of akrasia, the 
rational part of the soul and the nonrational forces have already made their positions 
known in what the agent should do in the scenario at hand. It is only at the moment 
when the agent makes its final choice to obey the nonrational forces that the rational 
part of the soul creates a belief to support following through on the action that it 
 
4 Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010): 79 
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had just warned against; the ‘nonrational’ belief is created only after the consent is 
given by the agent to act. The nonrational action is then rationalized in retrospect 
to the action. To clarify, it does not seem necessary that the action itself is already 
followed through for the rationalization to take place, but it is necessary that the 
agent has chosen to obey the nonrational parts of the soul and whatever desires it 
bids the rational part of the soul to rationalize. Once the rationalization takes place, 
it seems almost impossible for the agent to backtrack and totally protect itself from 
acting contrary to reason; the rational part of the soul is now corrupted, and now 
beliefs in obedience and defiance to reason are competing for primacy. While not 
completely protected, the agent can still possibly choose the beliefs that the rational 
part of the soul had created before the dilemma had emerged, but it is much harder 
for the agent to do so at this point as opposed to the point before it willingly gave 
nonrational forces permission to use the rational part of the soul to create beliefs 
sympathetic to their desires. During this whole deliberation period, since reason is 
the only reliable master for the agent to obey to do what is most beneficial, the 
agent, in choosing to both rationalize the nonrational and then obey the rationalized 
beliefs has made it possible to commit akrasia. It seems right that even when the 
agent has chosen to abandon reason, the beliefs the rational part of the soul had 
formed on its own are still present in the soul, but only willingly silenced by the 
agent just as an audience does while trying to enjoy a dramatic performance.  
If the beliefs from the rational part of the soul are still present but willingly 
silenced so the agent can obey the nonrational forces of the soul, and its rationalized 
beliefs, without conflict, then that itself seems like a case of akrasia. Indeed, it 
seems like the mere choice of the agent to rationalize the nonrational forces or to 
dim the rational part of the soul can be seen as something contrary to reason, and 
thus not the most beneficial action to take. Before the rationalization, there is a 
moment where the only beliefs in the person’s soul are from the rational part of the 
soul. In this moment, the only way for the nonrational parts of the soul to have their 
desires rationalized is if the agent chooses to place the nonrational part of the soul 
in charge and have the rational part create beliefs for them. So, in this moment, if 
the agent chooses to rationalize the nonrational, the agent acts against what it 
believes to be most beneficial, and thus commits akrasia on the metalevel––that is, 
the agent committed akrasia during the deliberation period rather than after 
deliberating and acting. 
The case of the drunk driver comes to mind as a pertinent example, even as 
a macrocosm of what takes place within a soul at the moment of decision. The 
actions of the drunk driver during his intoxication are hard to read, as the rational 
part of his soul is dimmed. It is clear that his actions are rarely going to be 
beneficial, but it is also clear that his actions do not seem to be his own. One could 
argue that akrasia is not present in his situation; his actions are not done in 
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deliberate contradiction to his reason as it is dimmed by intoxication. The akrasia 
is clearly present, however, in the run up to his intoxication; he willingly chose to 
intoxicate himself to a point where his reason could not fight back against 
nonrational forces. It seems like this example of akrasia is even more evident when 
someone deliberately does this to drown the reason into silence. So, when someone 
deliberately silences his reason, giving the nonrational forces power over his 
actions so that the rational part of the soul rationalizes the nonrational desires, that 
seems to be a case of akrasia. 
These cases of akrasia seem even able to withstand the knowledge 
requirement that Socrates’ seems to make. Evans argues that the component of 
knowledge is key to Socrates’ argument against akrasia, given that knowledge is 
not something that can be swayed by any appetite or emotion.5 I think that this 
aspect does not sufficiently address the issue that I raised with the deliberate choice 
that the agent possesses. If an agent has knowledge of what is most beneficial, even 
the knowledge that Socrates suggests is possible, the agent can still choose to place 
nonrational forces in the ruling position of the soul, just as a man can willingly 
silence his reason to momentarily silence any conflict in his soul. To again use 
Plato’s example of the city-to-man analogy as an illustration, it is possible for the 
reasoned element of a city, the philosophers, to have true knowledge, but simply 
having that knowledge does not mean that the reasoned element of the city is 
thereby placed in command of the city’s affairs. Unless the reasoned element of the 
city is placed in power by the city, the knowledge will not be used to rule the actions 
of the city. So it is with the agent’s soul that unless the reason rules according to 
the agent’s consent, even knowledge will not be sufficient to avoid wrongdoing. 
The appetites or the spirit or any other nonrational force would be in charge, and 
the knowledge that the rational part possesses will be ignored. Again, it seems even 
choosing to put the nonrational forces in charge is a case of metalevel akrasia, 
which still seems possible with knowledge given the agent’s aforementioned power 
of decision. 
Some Objections 
A possible objection to my metalevel counterexample could be that it is impossible 
to tell that in any moment of deliberation the rational part of the soul has generated 
beliefs of its own prior to the nonrational parts bullying the agent to rationalize 
nonrational desires. This objection can be thwarted by illustrating the persistence 
of rational beliefs about decisions before, during, and after the action is undertaken. 
People hold rational beliefs about what they should and should not do whether they 
are in the respective circumstance the rational belief is about. People concerned 
 
5 Matthew Evans, “A Partisan’s Guide to Socratic Intellectualism,” in Desire, Practical Reason, 
and the Good, ed. Sergio Tenenbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 6-33 
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with health always believe that eating inordinate amounts of cake is bad for their 
health, but it is only during a moment of deliberation when the appetites rise that 
an agent would choose to rationalize their appetites and pit them against the purely 
rational beliefs. When the moment of deliberation is past, they will again have their 
rational beliefs about eating cake, this time cleared of all rationalized appetites, 
along with a feeling of accomplishment or guilt depending on the action they took. 
There is an objection that seems common among some scholars that 
Socrates’ rejection of akrasia hinges entirely on the premise that hedonism is true. 
Weiss argues in favor of such a position, going so far as to say, “The alternative to 
this general approach is…to understand Socrates to be denying, only given 
hedonism, the possibility of acting contrary to one’s beliefs. It is only once…people 
have been transformed into one-dimensional pleasure maximizers that akrasia is 
precluded.”6 Since knowledge is described as an accurate system of measuring the 
pleasures and pains that one may experience in life, then having this knowledge 
would indeed preclude any deviation from the most beneficial good, according to 
Weiss. This will align with Socrates’ argument that ignorance is to blame for errors 
in judgement, but not a willing choice, since it is always the goal of maximal 
pleasure that is being pursued in hedonism. I will not, however, go into the details 
of how Socrates does not reject akrasia in the absence of hedonism because it is 
irrelevant to the argument and counterexample I have presented. Even in hedonism, 
akrasia is still possible. In my counterexample, the deliberation could be about any 
kind of beneficial standard, hedonist or not, and it will still result in the possibility 
of akrasia in the moment of decision of whether to rationalize the nonrational 
desires in the soul. If ultimate pleasure is concerned, and one’s rational belief is that 
abstaining from cake will be more pleasurable overall for one’s life, then choosing 
to rationalize the nonrational desire to eat cake will still be a case of akrasia on the 
metalevel as I have already illustrated. 
Conclusion 
Socrates’ argument against the possibility of akrasia is compelling and more 
forceful than one might initially think given its simple and counterintuitive nature, 
but it is unsound due to the counterexample I have proposed objecting to the 
inference to (3) from (1) and (2) that Socrates proposes in Protagoras. I have 
presented a sound psychology showing that the soul is composed of a rational part 
of the soul and at least one nonrational part and that the rational part of the soul is 
alone capable of generating beliefs. In that, and against objections, I have shown 
that beliefs generated by the rational part of the soul are solely present in the soul 
before rationalization of nonrational desires takes place. In rationalizing the 
 
6 Roslyn Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006): 62-63 
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nonrational, which is an action contrary to reason, one commits akrasia on the 
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